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Belief revision is the process of changing beliefs to take into account new information. The
last four decades of exploratory inquiry on the Dynamics of Belief has been to logically
recover from circumstantial inconsistency, and had produced advances in the understanding
of this multifaceted area. Contributing to the study of belief revision are philosophy, formal
logic, economics, computer science and artificial intelligence, each with its own different
perspectives. Many significant contributions have led to the consolidation of the field in a
solid formal structure that supports many exciting proposals of future research lines that
stem from that foundation.
Computational Argumentation, on the other hand, represents another area engaged in
the study of ascertaining what a reasoning agent could safely assume in the context of
conflicting belief. The problems studied in this domain of research have been the concern
of philosophers for millennia, and after the formalization of Logic as a distinct domain of
inquiry, many matters became defined well enough as to be studied computationally.
This special issue, combines these areas of research intending to achieve a fruitful cross-
fertilization that will be helpful for both.
Until recently, these two areas of Knowledge Representation have been pursuing their
goals along essentially independent research programs. Nevertheless, the task of model-
ing reasoning processes is an exceedingly challenging, very captivating, and a quite fruitful
endeavor for these communities. Belief Dynamics and Argumentation partially capture
distinct but surely non-disjoint aspects of the knowledge representation and reasoning chal-
lenges, with many opportunities of interchange to address open questions. There exist many
places in a possible complex architecture of a reasoning agent where these two areas can
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The five papers contained in this special issue were inspired by discussions during the 3rd
Madeira Workshop on Belief Revision, Argumentation, Ontologies, and Norms (BRAON-
2017). This collection includes research advanced from the interaction between these areas
of research concerned with the epistemic state of an agent. As such, these papers reflect dis-
similar perspectives that have contributed to advance the understanding of such a hard and
stimulating problem. Our purpose in offering this collection is to reach a wider audience and
stimulate research on this compelling topic. We believe that the interaction between Belief
Revision and Argumentation will help advance the goals of understanding them separately,
and more broadly, understanding the cognitive architecture of a reasoning agent.
In Impossibility Results for Belief Contraction, by Sven Ove Hansson, the author show
how three apparently weak and plausible conditions cannot be satisfied by a contraction
operator acting on belief sets since they are logically incompatible.
In the survey A Review of the Relations Between Logical Argumentation and Reasoning
with Maximal Consistency by Ofer Arieli, AnneMarie Borg and Jesse Heyninck, a selection
of results associating Dung-style semantics for different logical argumentation frameworks
and particular forms of reasoning with maximally consistent sets of premises. The author
also explores the formalisms considering some rationality postulates, carrying the analysis
to the corresponding proof systems in nonmonotonic reasoning.
The work presented in Two AGM-Style Characterizations of Model Repair by Paulo T.
Guerra and Renata Wassermann, formally examines model repair under the perspective of
the AGM theory. Two forms of obtaining model repair are described–one through belief
sets an another by means of structural changes. Different sets of postulates are advanced
and examined in relation to the intuitive rationality of the problem of model repair and
presenting two representation results formulating the connection between them.
In Probability, Coherent Belief and Coherent Belief Change, by John Cantwell and Hans
Rott, the authors analyze the statics and dynamics of belief states where these states are
formalized as pairs that include the agent’s credences and their categorical beliefs; the first
is described as a subjective probability measure and the second expressed as a set of possible
worlds. This framework is properly examined considering the principles of Inclusion and
Preservation for belief revision and the principle of Recovery for belief withdrawals, and
the Levi and Harper identities.
Finally, the paper entitled Practical Reasoning Using Values: An Argumentative
Approach Based on a Hierarchy of Values by Juan C. L. Teze, Antoni Perelló-Moragues,
Lluis Godo and Pablo Noriega, introduces a formal framework based on defeasible argu-
mentation to support the choice of actions of a value-driven agent and arrange these actions
into plans matching the agent’s preferences. The values the agent considers are assumed as
satisfying a partial order in a hierarchy that which is employed in the resolution of conflicts
between incommensurable values.
We want to acknowledge and extend our deeply felt appreciation to everyone who has
contributed to this issue and to the Madeira Workshop series, particularly the participants,
authors, and reviewers. It has become a source of inspiration for the work on the common
area that combines Belief Revision and Argumentation. Finally, and distinctly, we also thank
the editorial and publishing staff at Springer for their support, especially Martin Golumbic,
editor-in-chief of the Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.
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